What Is In a Vaccine?

Michael Moore 18 November 2020

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Few know what is contained within a vaccine and they might be surprised and even a little disturbed to find out what some of the ingredients are.

It is always a good idea to ask your medical practitioner or health advisor what the ingredients are in the vaccine he or she is encouraging you to take so here is a typical breakdown of the ingredients you may find in a vaccine.

MMR (MMR-II) 2/2020 (Vaccine for Measles or Rubella) for example may contain:

• Vitamins.

• amino acids. Amino acids are organic compounds that contain amine (–NH2) and carboxyl (–COOH) functional groups, along with a side chain (R group) specific to each .

• fetal bovine serum. Fetal bovine serum (FBS) comes from the blood drawn from a bovine fetus via a closed system of collection at the slaughterhouse. Fetal bovine serum is the most widely used serum-supplement for the in vitro cell culture of eukaryotic cells. In other words blood from an unborn or recently born calf.

• Sucrose, Sugar

• Glutamate. A thickener

• Recombinant human Albumin (Human) 5% is a sterile, liquid preparation of albumin derived from large pools of human plasma or blood.

• Neomycin, an antibiotic

• Sorbitol, less commonly known as glucitol is a sugar alcohol

• hydrolyzed gelatin, Hydrolyzed gelatin is the result of gelatin in hydrolysis. The act of hydrolyzing something means to break it down by using water. It should be noted that most gelatine comes from the bones of animals.

• Sodium phosphate, a type of salt

• Sodium. Salt

Other vaccines contain similar ingredients. A few will contain Mercury (not so common these days) in the form of Thimerosal which is a form of mercury ‘considered’ safe due to the small amount used.

Also Formaldehyde (Formaldehyde is a colorless, strong-smelling gas used in making building materials and many household products. It is used in pressed-wood products, such as particleboard, plywood, and fiberboard; glues and adhesives; permanent-press fabrics; paper product coatings; and certain insulation materials. Ingestion of formaldehyde can be fatal, and long-term exposure to low levels in the air or on the skin can cause asthma-like respiratory problems and skin irritation such as dermatitis and itching. Concentrations of 100 ppm are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)) is used in some vaccines (especially Polio vaccines)

Apart from the chemicals used, with the contents including ingredients from animals and humans, this would be of concern to:

1. Some religions and there adherences, such as Hindus, Sikhs’ Jehovah’s witness to name but a few.

2. Vegetarians and Vegans.

3. Anyone who objects to having injected into their body the blood of animals and humans.

They may exercise the right to refuse on religious or health grounds.

In addition, the apparent urgency of rapid development and production of a vaccine for the COVID‑19 pandemic is likely to increase the risks and failure rate of delivering a safe, effective vaccine. One study found that between 2006 and 2015, the success rate of obtaining approval from Phase I to successful Phase III trials was 16.2% for vaccines, and CEPI indicates a potential success rate of only 10% for vaccine candidates in 2020 development. Seems to be a very poor result for a blanket medication of an entire population.

NOW, the ingredients for a COVID-19 Vaccination have emerged as listed on the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine and include:

ChAd0x1-s Recombinant. Recombinant DNA molecules are DNA molecules formed by laboratory methods of genetic recombination to bring together genetic material from multiple sources, creating sequences that would not otherwise be found in the genome.

Another ingredient listed by AstraZeneca is MRC-5. For the uninitiated MRC-5 (Medical Research Council cell strain 5) is a diploid human cell culture line composed of fibroblasts, originally developed from research deriving lung tissue of a 14-week-old aborted Caucasian male fetus.

“The Italian vaccine research and advocacy organization Corvelva recently released new data regarding the use of aborted fetal cell lines in vaccines.

The research reports the results produced from the MRC 5 cell line analysis, particularly the one contained in GlaxoSmithKline’s tetravalent measles-mumps-rubella-chickenpox (MMRV) vaccine.

1. The Corvelva team summarized their findings as follows:

2. The fetal cell line was found to belong to a male fetus.

3. The cell line presents itself in such a way that it is likely to be very old, thus consistent with the declared line of the 1960s.

4. The fetal human DNA represented in this vaccine is a complete individual genome, that is, the genomic DNA of all the chromosomes of an individual is present in the vaccine.

5. The human genomic DNA contained in this vaccine is clearly, undoubtedly abnormal, presenting important inconsistencies with a typical human genome, that is, with that of a healthy individual.

6. 560 genes known to be associated with forms of cancer were tested and all underwent major modifications.

7. There are variations whose consequences are not even known, not yet appearing in the literature, but which still affect genes involved in the induction of human cancer.

What is also clearly abnormal is the genome excess showing changes in the number of copies and structural variants.…the DNA contained in these vaccines is potentially TUMORIGENIC… Corvelva notes that, according to the guidelines (which are found in the report), the presence of fetal DNA from cell lines MRC-5 and WI-38, as diploids, does not provide for upper limits: there is no limit to the amount they can find inside a vaccine. The motivation lies in the fact that these lines are not considered tumors because they have a “finite” (not immortalized) replicative cycle.” Naturtalnana website. MRC-5: What is that?

Something that would be of concern to certain philosophies and religions as well as vegetarians and vegans and contains many ethics issues of concern.

References:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fetal_bovine_serum#:~:text=Fetal%20bovine%20serum%20(FBS)%20comes,cell%20culture%20of%20eukaryotic%20cells.

https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/what-is-in-vaccines-fact-sheet.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_vaccine#Use_of_adjuvants

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41573-020-00073-5

https://iamnaturalnana.wordpress.com/2019/11/07/mrc-5-know-what-that-is/

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31604-4/fulltext

Money and Vaccines

Michael Moore 15 November 2020

The MHRA have a tender out. United Kingdom-London, Software Package and Information Systems Contract Award Notice which contains the following text

“The MHRA urgently seeks an artificial Intelligence (AI) software tool to process the expected high volume of COVID -19 vaccine Adverse Drug Reaction (ADRs) and ensure that no details from the ADR’s reaction text are missed.”

Does this mean they are expecting a high number of adverse reactions and simply want to know how many there are?

Coincidently, the same day that Pfizer announced the vaccine for Covid will be ready, the CEO, Albert Bourla, sold 5.6 million dollars worth of stock.

I wonder if these two facts are related.

In Australia. Where the vaccine is poised for distribution after a ‘quick’ testing by a company with an impressive track record of being sued for adverse reactions to their skimpily tested drugs (AstraZencca) the Prime Minister has instituted legislation where one CANNOT sue any pharmaceutical company for any vaccination adverse effects. Hmmmm. Now why would you do that?

Perhaps it is because, AstraZeneca plc/AB a British-Swedish multinational pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical company with headquarters in Cambridge, United Kingdom and Södertälje, Sweden, is notoriously corrupt having been fined a total of $1.149 billion over a history of civil and criminal offences including:

• Giving illegal financial inducements to doctors while marketing a prostate cancer drug – misleading consumers into thinking one drug was superior to its older drug, which was losing its patent protection

• Illegally marketing an anti-psychotic drug for uses not approved and failed to adequately describe its risks in an advertisement for the drug in a medical journal

• In 2002 refusing to put a more conspicuous warning label on its lung cancer drug Iressa after several patients in Japan suffered pneumonia and some died

• Misusing patent rules to shield its ulcer drug from generic competitors (fined 60m euros) Acted “unfairly and deceptively” in pricing a prostate cancer drug. Later hit with a $12.9m judgment

• Violating US False Claims Act by failing to provide required rebates to state Medicaid programs

• US subsidiary’s president and chief executive charged with replacing mothers and older female employees with young single women who were pressured into having sex with company executives used of transfer pricing techniques to dodge StgUK500m tax liability

• Committed accounting violations in connection with improper payments made in Russia and China to boost drug sales.

According to Martin Kulldorff a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and a eminent biostatistician and epidemiologist whose research centers on the early detection and monitoring of infectious disease outbreaks, opposing lockdowns has stated.

“As history has shown, and as epidemiologists agree, the fastest and most natural way to protect the most vulnerable people is to achieve herd immunity in a community by the more numerous, least vulnerable people catching the virus as soon as possible, suffering just a little, if at all, as this then causes the virus to flame out when it cannot find new, non-immune victims. Accordingly, maskists, by their own logic, are actually slowing the achievement of herd immunity, which exposes the most vulnerable for longer than is otherwise necessary. … It seems to me then that, by maskist logic, they are the ones who are being selfish, since they are not willing to put their health marginally on the line for the benefit of the most vulnerable. I'm tired of being told that we normal people are the selfish ones. I'm also tired of seeing those signs in New York about "We're New York tough" combined with "Wear a mask." Hey New Yorkers, if you were actually tough, then you'd take one for the team, get the virus, suffer some mild symptoms, and help get to herd immunity faster.”

And according to Dr Zoe Harcombe Ph. D

“1) Organisations invested in vaccines make money from vaccines. If people acquire natural immunity, they have reduced or no need for a vaccine and thus the potential gain for the vaccine company is reduced.

2) Locking people in their homes and other lockdown measures will reduce the number of people who acquire natural immunity.

Would this be by design perhaps? Or an error in judgement?

There have been thousands of cases where pharmaceutical companies have had to settle in court for drug adverse reactions. Here are just a few:

1. Vaccine court settlement payouts increased in total $91.2 million in 2015, up from $22.8 million in 2014 to $114 million in 2015 — a 400% increase.

2. Vaccine court settlement payments for flu shots increased the most, from $4.9 million in 2014 to $61 million in 2015 — an increase of more than 1000%, despite autumnal onslaughts every year of media/pr/advertising campaigns urging Americans to ‘get your flu shot,’ with total abandon for the statistical facts coming out of the vaccine court.

3. Varicella (chicken pox) had the third biggest increase — from $0 in 2014 to $5.8 million in 2015. (No surprise shingles is on the rise among the elderly population, as recently vaccinated grandchildren continuously shed live virus to their unsuspecting elders.)

4. Hepatitis B was the fourth largest increase in vaccine court settlements, increasing 321% in 2015 to more than $8 million in 2015 from $1.9 million in 2014.

5. TDap/DTP/DPT and D/T shots were the fifth largest increase, leaping 75% in 2014 from $5.5 million to $9.8.

Since then there have been hundreds of other settlements worth billions of dollars.

There is no doubt that many drugs created do good work. However, drugs that are ‘produced’ quickly without the appropriate measures and tests have been shown to produce some devastating effects.

Producing a drug or vaccine within a year to combat a virus that is relatively mild and which, with herd immunity, would quickly dissipate, according to epidemiologists I hasten to add, not me, leads me to believe there is an ulterior motive for the creation and distribution of a ‘mass’ vaccine for a ‘mass’ vaccination program in which adverse effects are either discounted or simply monitored with no follow up for rectification.

I remain deeply suspicious.

References:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDUIS2kUCbA&feature=emb_logo

https://www.zoeharcombe.com/2020/11/sage-conflicts-of-interest/

https://www.seetvnews.com/post/sutton-and-halton-the-vaccination-game

https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/reports-statistics

https://www.nvic.org/CMSTemplates/NVIC/pdf/NVIC-amicus-as-filed-090809.pdf

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CDC Report: Officials Knew Coronavirus Test Was Flawed But Released It Anyway

Source npr.org November 6, 20205:06 AM ET

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On Feb. 6, a scientist in a small infectious disease lab on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention campus in Atlanta was putting a coronavirus test kit through its final paces. The lab designed and built the diagnostic test in record time, and the little vials that contained necessary reagents to identify the virus were boxed up and ready to go. But NPR has learned the results of that final quality control test suggested something troubling — it said the kit could fail 33% of the time.

Under normal circumstances, that kind of result would stop a test in its tracks, half a dozen public and private lab officials told NPR. But an internal CDC review obtained by NPR confirms that lab officials decided to release the kit anyway. The revelation comes from a CDC internal review, known as a "root-cause analysis," which the agency conducted to understand why an early coronavirus test didn't work properly and wound up costing scientists precious weeks in the early days of a pandemic.

In addition to learning of the early warning, reviewers determined the Respiratory Viruses Diagnostic Laboratory, run by a highly regarded scientist named Stephen Lindstrom, was beset with problems, including "process failures, a lack of appropriate recognized laboratory quality standards, and organizational problems related to the support and management of a laboratory supporting an outbreak response," the review said.

The CDC declined to make Lindstrom or anyone else available for an interview and declined to discuss the unreleased internal review. A spokesman would only say that the agency had "acknowledged and corrected mistakes along the way."

Like building a house without a hammer

In late January, the tally of confirmed COVID-19 cases seemed relatively manageable — about 4,500 confirmed cases worldwide and under a dozen confirmed in the continental United States. In a pandemic, public health officials say, the best hope to keep the numbers low is to determine who else might have the virus and where it was spreading and then concentrate efforts on those areas first.

The CDC's coronavirus test kits began arriving at the 100 or so public labs across the country in small white boxes on Feb. 6, according to the CDC timeline in the review. Each cardboard container held four tiny vials of chemicals that, when used properly, were meant to confirm the presence of the virus.

The New York City Public Health Laboratory was in that first wave of labs receiving the kits, and its director, Jennifer Rakeman, said her technicians began trying to verify the test right away. Verification is a standard protocol; it involves following detailed instructions to ensure the tests work the same way in an outside lab as they do at the CDC labs in Atlanta.

A technician prepares coronavirus test samples on New York's Long Island. The head of New York City's public labs said fighting the virus without a test was like building a house with a saw but no hammer.

The first three vials in the box were specific to the coronavirus, and the fourth was a control that let the labs know the specimen they were examining was a good one. Essentially, Rakeman said, it lets you know if the swab went all the way up a patient's nose and wasn't just "waved in the air."

By Feb. 8, hours after her lab started verifying the test kits, Rakeman said she began receiving panicked emails from colleagues. Something, they said, was wrong: They had run the tests dozens of times but were getting inconclusive results from two of the reagents, or chemicals, in the vials.

Rakeman began calling other labs to see if they were experiencing the same problem, and they said they were. "It was very truly an 'oh, crap' moment," Rakeman said. "These reagents aren't working; everybody is waiting for us all over the city to have this test online. We think we have more cases than we've been able to detect and the test isn't working."

She said trying to battle COVID-19, which was just starting to rage through New York, without a test was like trying to build a house with a saw but no hammer. "And we need that hammer. We need that other tool, we need that test," she said.

Contamination

When the complaints reached the CDC, leaders at the lab said they suspected the problem was contamination, according to Department of Health and Human Services officials who spoke to them at the time. Low-level contamination was to blame for a problem with a Middle East respiratory syndrome CDC test years ago. Microscopic residue could roil and ruin a sensitive test such as the one built to find the coronavirus.

Key CDC officials thought that might be the problem, too. "Contamination is one possible explanation, but there are others, and I can't really comment on what is an ongoing investigation," Nancy Messonnier, director of the CDC's National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, told reporters in March.

CDC Director Robert Redfield confers with Nancy Messonnier, director of the CDC's National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, during a Jan. 28 press conference in Washington, D.C., on the public health response to the coronavirus.

The contamination theory gained momentum after Timothy Stenzel, director of the Food and Drug Administration's Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health, visited the respiratory disease lab a few weeks later.

He returned to his superiors in Washington, D.C., saying he found sloppy lab protocols. Researchers entered and exited the coronavirus laboratories without changing their coats, he said. Testing ingredients were assembled in the same room where researchers had been working on positive coronavirus samples, he told them, according to three officials who were part of the discussion at the time. These are the sorts of things that can introduce microscopic contamination.

CDC and HHS officials disagree with Stenzel's characterization of the lab. One former CDC official who was there when he arrived said the issues were small. "It was beakers on a counter that were empty and washed within 7 feet of a negative pressure hood. He called that dirty. Was that protocol? No. But it wasn't a dirty lab."

The FDA declined to make Stenzel available for this story.

While the CDC and HHS were trying to determine what was wrong with the kits, public labs were still waiting for something they could use. "We waited another month before we had testing available," Rakeman told NPR.

''Absence or failure of document control''

Lindstrom, who led the respiratory disease lab, had invented diagnostic tests in the past. Before he went to the infectious diseases lab, he was running a different CDC lab, one that focused on influenza.

When he was there, he had helped create the diagnostic tests that were used to identify H1N1 in patients, and there were no issues with the test. The FDA quickly approved the kits and sent them to labs across the country. Within days, the same kits were dispatched around the world. The effort was considered a triumph for the CDC, and Lindstrom was viewed internally as the guy who made it happen.

The influenza lab, however, had an infrastructure and systematic way of responding to flu outbreaks, and because of that Lindstrom and his team just had to do the science, one official said. The infrastructure was already there to help. COVID-19 was different. When Lindstrom first built the test at the infectious disease lab, for instance, he didn't have any human sample of the virus, so it had to be manufactured.

What's more, officials say, Lindstrom built the coronavirus test the same way he would have built one for influenza. It was, after all, what he knew best. The problem was, the coronavirus had more in common with SARS or MERS — respiratory diseases that hit the Middle East and Asia in 2002 and 2012 — than something like H1N1.

HHS officials said there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the test Lindstrom's lab built but had Lindstrom been at the infectious disease lab longer, he might have pulled a MERS test out of the freezer and used that as the template for a coronavirus test instead because it had more in common with a respiratory virus than influenza did.

Because the respiratory disease lab had fewer entrenched systems than Lindstrom's previous lab, the review also found that basic mistakes were made. "The absence or failure of document control to ensure the use of a single verified correct test quality control procedure matching [Emergency Use Authorization] procedure," the review said, "resulted in deficiencies."

The FDA had required a particular protocol be followed when designing the test, and the lab didn't seem to be using the correct one, it said. "The first round of [quality control] for final kit release used an 'incorrect' testing procedure," it said. "Later in the timeline, detection of a 33 percent kit failure" using the correct quality control protocols "did not result in a kit recall or a performance alert."

ProPublica reported last month on the events inside the CDC lab at the time of the test failure. This is the first time the CDC internal review's findings have been made public.

Kelly Wroblewski, director of infectious diseases at the Association of Public Health Laboratories, said she was surprised that Lindstrom's lab would be called out for something as basic as quality control. That hasn't been her experience. "I've done studies with Steve, and he's meticulous in so many ways so the documentation failure is really surprising," she said.

When the lab ran the very last quality control test, using the correct Emergency Use Authorization procedures and showing a possible 33% failure rate, it was Feb. 6, according to the review. The kits, with their four little vials, were already in their boxes. There was time to recall them before they went out, but Lindstrom decided not to do that, three officials familiar with the review said.

CDC headquarters in Atlanta in April. The CDC review made some recommendations so such a failure doesn't happen again.

One HHS official told NPR this shouldn't have been a tough call. "The QC records showed that the test had a problem," the official said. "Lindstrom signed off on a quality control that was clearly flawed. He should not have released that kit."

Wroblewski agreed. "The thing that hangs me up most is probably the 33% and not recalling or not immediately going to remanufacture or something at that point," she said, "because 33% is clearly a lot."

Compounding the problem, officials said, was the fact that the CDC had not established specific benchmarks for the test. There was not, for example, an agency directive that said the test needed to be correct some specific percentage of the time before it could be released.

Obviously, the CDC would like the tests to be completely accurate, one official told NPR, but something less than that is typically acceptable, particularly during a public health crisis.

Because there was no benchmark set for acceptance, it became Lindstrom's call. He appears to have decided either that the last quality control test was wrong or that the 33% failure rate was acceptable, officials said.

Ramping up testing

The inspector general for HHS is also investigating why that first coronavirus test failed and has not yet completed its report.

The CDC review has some recommendations so a failure such as this one doesn't happen again. Among them: setting specific criteria that must be met before test kits can go to public labs, and now requiring that an outside group reviews all the CDC tests.

NPR has confirmed that Lindstrom is no longer in the respiratory disease lab, and the CDC has effectively removed all the leadership from the division of viral diseases that oversaw the lab. A CDC spokesman declined to discuss CDC personnel issues.

NPR's Monika Evstatieva and Barbara Van Woerkom contributed to this report.

Source: https://www.npr.org/2020/11/06/929078678/cdc-report-officials-knew-coronavirus-test-was-flawed-but-released-it-anyway